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REEXAMINING JOINT EMPLOYMENT WAGE
AND HOUR CLAIMS FOLLOWING DYNAMEX
AND AB 5
Alexander Moore*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2017, Jeffery Lines sued his employer, Tenet Concepts
(“Tenet”), alleging that the company violated wage and hour laws by
altering paychecks to avoid payment of overtime1 and by forcing employees to work off-the-clock, including during meal breaks.2 Lines
was one of over four hundred delivery drivers employed by Tenet3 but
effectively working for Amazon. Rather than employ its own drivers,
Amazon contracted with Tenet to provide the labor necessary to allow
for same-day delivery of products listed on Amazon. These drivers,
though officially Tenet employees, operated out of Amazon warehouses, delivered Amazon packages, and wore Amazon uniforms.4
Accordingly, Lines also listed Amazon as a defendant on the complaint,5 alleging that Amazon and Tenet jointly employed him and the
other drivers.6 However, through an indemnification clause, Tenet was
required to pay for Amazon’s defense.7 Fearing an anticipated
$800,000 in legal costs, Tenet filed for bankruptcy protection.8 Lines’s

* J.D. Candidate, May 2021, Loyola Marymount University, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; B.A., Political Science, Tufts University, 2014. Many thanks to Professor Carlos Berdejo for
his insightful comments and to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for
their keen eyes. The views expressed in this Comment are my own, as are any remaining errors and
omissions.
1. First Amended Complaint at 2, Lines v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. 1:17-00072-LY (W.D.
Tex. Apr. 14, 2017).
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 8.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1.
6. Id. at 7.
7. Patricia Callahan, Amazon Pushes Fast Shipping but Avoids Responsibility for the Human
Cost, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/05/us/amazon-delivery-drivers-accidents.html.
8. Id.
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case was transferred to bankruptcy court, where Lines’s claim against
Amazon was stalled.9 Though Amazon was the true beneficiary of
Lines’s labor, and despite Amazon being the second company in world
history to be valued at over $1 trillion,10 Lines was unable to recover
his back wages of $7.25 per hour.11 Through its choice to outsource
its labor needs to Tenet, rather than employ its own delivery drivers,
Amazon effectively avoided the costs of employment and the liability
for labor violations stemming from the delivery of Amazon products.
How did this come to be?
Employment status confers many benefits to a worker. Most importantly for the purposes of this Comment, employment determines
a worker’s right to minimum wage and overtime protections.12 It also
entitles a worker to Social Security benefits, unemployment, worker’s
compensation, and the federal rights to collective bargaining and freedom from discrimination.13 These benefits, though, create substantial
costs for employers. According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
employment benefits represent nearly 30 percent of an employee’s total compensation costs, with standard wages representing the remaining 70 percent.14
To avoid these costs, some employers rely on legal—but problematic—means of shifting responsibility. National media has focused
extensively on the gig economy, wherein companies, such as the
rideshare giants Lyft and Uber, rely on workers classified as independent contractors to form their labor force.15 Because independent contractors do not receive the benefits associated with employment, they
are 20 to 30 percent cheaper than employees.16 If their drivers were

9. Id.; Order Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Lines v. Amazon.com, Inc., 1:17-00072LY (W.D. Tex. Aug. 9, 2018).
10. David Streitfeld, Amazon Hits $1,000,000,000,000 in Value, Following Apple, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/amazon-stock-price-1-trillionvalue.html?searchResultPosition=1.
11. Callahan, supra note 7; First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 8.
12. Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 115
(2018).
13. Id. at 115–16.
14. U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STATS., EMPLOYER COSTS FOR EMPLOYEE COMPENSATION—
DECEMBER 2019, at 1 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/ecec_03192020.pdf.
15. See Eli Rosenberg, Can California Rein in Tech’s Gig Platforms? A Primer on the Bold
State Law That Will Try, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2020/01/14/can-california-reign-techs-gig-platforms-primer-bold-state-lawthat-will-try/.
16. Id.
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classified as employees, it is estimated that Lyft and Uber would be
required to pay an additional $3,625 per driver annually in taxes and
benefits.17 Instead, these costs are passed onto the workers themselves,
who must pay their own self-employment taxes and bear the risks of
unemployment and work-related injury.
In recent years, this practice of purposefully labelling workers as
independent contractors to avoid the costs of employment—known as
misclassification—has come to the forefront of California politics. In
2018, the California Supreme Court introduced the ABC test for misclassification schemes in its case Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v.
Superior Court.18 This test, discussed in detail below, greatly limits an
employer’s ability to avoid the costs of its employees by misclassifying them as independent contractors. In 2019, the California legislature passed Assembly Bill 5 (AB 5), which codified the ABC test and
was seen as a direct attack on Lyft and Uber’s practices.19 In 2020,
after spending roughly $200 million, Lyft and Uber led a successful
ballot initiative, known as Proposition 22, which exempted app-based
delivery and rideshare companies from the ABC test, allowing these
companies to continue to classify their drivers as independent contractors.20
This fight over misclassification has largely overshadowed a separate—but closely related—means by which businesses in California
have avoided the costs of employment. Just as Lyft and Uber use independent contractor classification to pass costs directly onto their
workers, other businesses contract out their labor needs to separate
entities that—at least in theory—carry the costs of employing workers.
This practice can be illustrated by the Lines case. For the purposes of
this Comment, the business engaging in—and benefitting from—this
practice will be deemed the “lead,” exemplified by Amazon; the business that supplies labor will be deemed the “intermediary,” like Tenet.
17. Alison Griswold, How Much It Would Cost Uber and Lyft if Drivers Were Employees,
QUARTZ (June 14, 2019), https://qz.com/1643263/the-cost-to-uber-and-lyft-if-drivers-were-employees/.
18. 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
19. Rosenberg, supra note 15; Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
20. Taryn Luna, California Voters Approve Prop. 22, Allowing Uber and Lyft Drivers to Remain Independent Contractors, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2020), https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-11-03/2020-california-election-tracking-prop-22; see also CAL. BUS. & PROF.
CODE § 7450 (Deering 2021) (codifying the purpose of Prop. 22 as “protect[ing] the basic legal
right of Californians to choose to work as independent contractors with rideshare and delivery network companies . . . .”).
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In this business model, the intermediary acts as a buffer for the lead.
Though the workers are providing labor for the lead, only the intermediary is directly liable for labor violations. Because workers can exercise their employment rights against the intermediary, courts can
evade assessing the lead’s involvement.21 This business arrangement,
and the failure of the courts to fully consider its effects, has adverse
consequences on workers. As in Jeffery Lines’s case, a worker may be
unable to obtain judgment from the intermediary and unable to sustain
an action against the lead. In fact, as discussed below, the lead-intermediary relationship is itself responsible for promulgating the very labor violations a plaintiff might allege.
In the lead-intermediary relationship, the intermediary does generally classify its workers as employees. Thus, laws like AB 5, which
target misclassification—a practice whereby an employer labels its
workers as independent contractors to avoid employment costs—are
not applicable. Because the workers are already the intermediary’s
employees, the only relevant question is whether they are also the
lead’s employees.22
To answer this question, courts have long recognized the doctrine
of joint employment.23 Under this doctrine, a worker can be deemed
an employee of more than one employer, opening each employer to
joint and several liability for wage and hour violations, among other
abuses. 24 The joint employment doctrine arose to complement the
common law’s strict definition of employment. Under the common
law, an employer is one who controls the manner and means of the
employee’s performance of work.25 This definition is grounded in the
traditional concept of the master-servant relationship, where a master
physically imposes their will over a servant.26 Direct, physical control
over a worker became the key inquiry in determining employment under this definition.27 Where control is indirect or abstract, a court is
21. See, e.g., Curry v. Equilon Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 314 (Ct. App. 2018) (finding
that, where an intermediary has employed the plaintiff workers—and thus the workers have protections—looser standards are permissible in determining whether the lead is also an employer).
22. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019).
23. See, e.g., Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190, 195 (1973) (holding a maintenance company and
an apartment building owner to be joint employers of maintenance workers).
24. 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(f) (2019).
25. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07(3)(a) (AM. L. INST. 2006).
26. Shirley Lung, Exploiting the Joint Employer Doctrine: Providing a Break for Sweatshop
Garment Workers, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 291, 319 (2003).
27. Id.
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much less likely to find an employment relationship.28 Such a definition is ill-suited in the modern economy, where business formalities,
such as the lead-intermediary relationship, can be used to attenuate the
employment relationship.29
Thus, the federal and state governments have recognized and developed definitions of employment far more expansive than the common law.30 One such definition is “to suffer or permit work,” by which
a business is deemed an employer when work is performed for its benefit, whether authorized or not, provided the business had knowledge
the work was being performed and an opportunity to prevent it.31 The
United States Supreme Court has recognized that a broader definition
of employment would be difficult to fathom,32 and the California Supreme Court has held that California’s interpretation is even more expansive than its federal analogue.33 Still, the federal system has yet to
standardize its analysis of the “suffer or permit” definition, and the
California Supreme Court has neutered its application in joint employment cases.
This Comment seeks to shed light on the prevalence of the leadintermediary relationship, the dangers it presents for workers, and the
inadequacy of current California law to protect its workers’ rights.
California’s current standard for joint employment, developed in the
2010 California Supreme Court case Martinez v. Combs,34 affords a
far too narrow understanding of California’s expansive “suffer or permit” definition of employment.35 This understanding must be reconciled with Dynamex, wherein the California Supreme Court used the
“suffer or permit” definition to expand employment rights to workers
misclassified as independent contractors.36
This reconciliation is necessary because the Martinez standard,
which focuses on a business’s direct control over the workers involved, fails to account for a lead’s tacit encouragement of labor violations by its intermediaries. Only Dynamex’s interpretation, in which

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

See id.
Id. at 321.
See discussion infra Parts III–IV.
5 C.F.R. § 551.104 (2020).
United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945).
Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 12 (Cal. 2018).
231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010).
Id. at 279.
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 35.
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a purported employer suffers or permits all work performed within the
usual course of its business,37 creates liability for leads that implicitly
benefit from such violations.
Dynamex’s broader interpretation is supported by the legislative
and judicial history of the “suffer or permit” standard. Further, the Dynamex court’s main policy concern—a fear that lenient laws will perpetuate labor abuses—is expressed in the joint employment context by
the inherent dangers of the lead-intermediary relationship. A broad
joint employment standard will provide leads with an incentive structure to ensure compliance with labor law. Nevertheless, the use of intermediaries can be beneficial to both businesses and the public:
though employment status should be applied broadly, safeguards
should exist to protect beneficial intermediary relationships.
Part II describes the historical necessity for joint employment and
illustrates the modern means by which leads create sweatshop conditions. Part III provides a counterpoint, emphasizing the benefits of intermediary relationships and showing that not all relationships perpetuate sweatshop conditions. Part IV tracks the development of federal
law and the circuit courts’ split over joint employment. Part V explains
the California courts’ current understanding of joint employment in
Martinez. Part VI describes Dynamex’s broad proscription of employment status. Part VII argues for expanding California’s joint employment standard to match protections given to misclassified workers in
Dynamex. Part VIII describes available and potential safeguards to allow for beneficial uses of intermediaries. Part IX concludes this Comment.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF JOINT EMPLOYMENT
Employer wage theft, including minimum wage and overtime violations, is highly prevalent in the United States. Though California is
widely considered to be an employee-friendly state, its workers remain
susceptible to wage theft.38 A 2008 report found that, in Los Angeles
County, 88.5 percent of 1815 employees surveyed had experienced at
least one type of pay-based violation in the previous week,39 resulting
37. Id. at 37.
38. Matthew Fritz-Mauer, Comment, Lofty Laws, Broken Promises: Wage Theft and the Degradation of Low-Wage Workers, 20 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 71, 73–74 (2016).
39. RUTH MILKMAN ET AL., INST. FOR RSCH. ON LAB. & EMP., UNIV. OF CAL., L.A., WAGE
THEFT AND WORKPLACE VIOLATIONS IN LOS ANGELES: THE FAILURE OF EMPLOYMENT AND
LABOR LAW FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS 30 (2010).
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in a loss of 12.5 percent of average weekly earnings.40 The researchers
estimated a weekly loss of $26.2 million as a result of such violations.41 In industries where leads contract out for their labor needs, the
joint employment doctrine becomes a potential means for workers to
recover back wages even where their direct employer, the intermediary, is insolvent or otherwise judgment-proof.42
More importantly, the joint employment doctrine can also change
the incentive structure by which leads operate. The use of intermediaries allows leads to engage in business practices which maximize
profits while tacitly encouraging intermediaries to violate wage and
hour laws. Historically, these business practices are best exemplified
by the garment industry’s use of sweatshops, aptly named after a
lead’s ability to force its intermediaries and their workers to “sweat
out” profits through the violation of labor law.43 Today, the use of advanced technology and data collection allows leads to sweat profits
more effectively and on a larger scale, as illustrated below by Amazon’s use of Delivery Service Providers.
A. The Garment Industry and the Traditional Sweat Shop
Sweatshops—often depicted in popular media as dingy and
cramped basements brimming with garment workers and overseen by
an authoritarian supervisor—are inextricably bound to the lead-intermediary relationship. By contracting out their labor needs, garment
manufacturers have traditionally minimized their fixed production
costs, shielded themselves from swings in market demand, and
avoided liability for labor violations.44 The manufacturers’ incentive
for profit creates a vicious and self-promulgating labor market
wherein workers are routinely exploited.
The relationship is deceptively simple: a garment manufacturer
outsources the production of its garments to several contracted intermediaries. In doing so, the manufacturer passes on the labor and other
production costs of garment-making, as well as liability for labor violations. The manufacturer identifies the market need for certain garments and offers a contract price to an intermediary in return for the
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 53.
Id.
See, e.g., First Amended Complaint, supra note 1.
Lung, supra note 26, at 302.
Id. at 301.
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completed garments. The intermediary agrees to the contract price,
uses it to pay labor costs, and keeps any remaining amount as profit.
However, the economic reality of the relationship gives the manufacturer an inordinate amount of control in setting prices to maximize its
own profit.45 Intermediaries vastly outnumber manufacturers,46 and
with a limited number of contracts for garments, intermediaries looking to stay in business must underbid each other.47 Further aggravating
this power dynamic is the low barrier for creating an intermediary
business—a small shop, sewing equipment, and a few workers.48
When one intermediary fails, another rises to take its place, ensuring
that the manufacturer maintains a selection of competing intermediaries to choose from.
Because intermediaries have the same incentive as the manufacturer to maximize profit, they have a motivation to recoup low contract
prices by exploiting their workers. To stay in business, and to remain
profitable, intermediaries violate wage and hour laws.49 Once intermediaries choose to engage in these illegal practices, the system becomes
self-promulgating. Substandard labor conditions create a competitive
advantage:50 intermediaries that violate labor laws are able to accept
lower contract prices than those that do not. Over time, this results in
a “race to the bottom,” wherein labor-compliant intermediaries either
begin violating the law to stay competitive or are pushed out of business by non-compliant intermediaries.51
Without strong laws, such as an expansive joint employment doctrine, workers are left with little recourse. Because of low contract
prices, intermediaries are chronically undercapitalized52—though
workers could ostensibly sue for back wages and other violations,
there is no guarantee that a favorable judgment would result in actual
recompense. Embattled intermediaries often declare bankruptcy to
avoid judgment, later re-opening as new businesses.53 Further,
45. Id.
46. See id. at 302.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See Bruce Goldstein et. al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American
Sweatshop: Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1003–
04 (1999).
51. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 37–38 (Cal. 2018).
52. See Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1000.
53. Lung, supra note 26, at 305.
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sweatshops have traditionally preyed upon vulnerable groups, such as
undocumented immigrants, who are more likely to accept substandard
labor conditions when faced with adverse immigration outcomes
should they choose to report abuses.54
In 1999, in response to the exploitative incentives of the garment
industry, California passed a law requiring garment manufacturers to
guarantee the payment of minimum wage and overtime when outsourcing their labor needs to intermediaries.55 In 2015, under California Labor Code section 2810.3, the California Legislature extended
this requirement to many other industries that outsource work performed “within [the] usual course” of their business. 56 In 2018, the
California Labor Commissioner’s Office used section 2810.3 to issue
a $4.5 million fine against Cheesecake Factory and its janitorial contractor after the contractor failed to pay minimum wages and overtime
to its custodians.57 Again, in 2019, the Labor Commissioner’s Office
issued a $1.6 million fine against Trader Joe’s and its inventory contractor for similar failures.58
However, section 2810.3 is limited to labor that occurs “within or
upon the premises” of the lead59 and explicitly does not apply to labor
outsourced to a “motor carrier of property.”60 Thus, the sweating system continues to operate unchecked in the delivery industry. In the
absence of such laws, Amazon has successfully created one of the
largest and most technologically advanced sweatshops in modern history.
B. Amazon’s Last Mile Delivery System: A Modern-Day Sweatshop
In a traditional delivery relationship, a business uses true third
parties, such as the UPS or FedEx, to deliver its goods. The business
agrees to a standard delivery rate and provides the packages to be
54. Id. at 307.
55. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2673.1 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
56. Id. § 2810.3(a)(1)(A). This is a term of art later used in Dynamex as a test for employment
and a major topic of this Comment. See discussion infra Section VI.C.
57. News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., Labor Commissioner’s Office Cites Cheesecake
Factory, Janitorial Contractors More than $4.5 Million for Wage Theft Violations (June 11, 2018),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2018/2018-40.pdf.
58. News Release, Cal. Dep’t of Indus. Rels., California Labor Commissioner’s Office Cites
Inventory Company, Grocers More than $1.6 Million for Wage Theft Violations (Nov. 5, 2019),
https://www.dir.ca.gov/DIRNews/2019/2019-83.html.
59. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3(a)(6).
60. Id. § 2810.3(p).
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shipped but does not maintain oversight or control over the delivery
process. Though delivery is an intrinsic part of all e-commerce, the
delivery itself does not fall within the purview of the seller—it is instead the duty of a third-party carrier like UPS. Amazon, though, blurs
this line by operating as both a seller of goods and as a delivery company. Amazon has built its own delivery network rivaling UPS and
FedEx—in 2018, it was capable of reaching 72 percent of American
households within 24 hours.61 As noted by the Lines62 case, Amazon
uses intermediaries, which Amazon calls Delivery Service Providers
(DSPs), to fulfill its vast demands for speedy home delivery. Under
this business model, Amazon maintains oversight and control over the
delivery of its goods in a way that nearly all other e-commerce businesses do not. This relationship closely mirrors the garment industry’s
traditional sweatshop model but uses modern technology and Amazon’s massive reserve of wealth to further streamline Amazon’s profit
maximization.
Amazon effectively monitors intermediary profit margins and adjusts its contracts as necessary to keep those margins thin. Much like
the garment industry, Amazon pays most of its intermediaries a flat
contract fee for each delivery route.63 This fee must cover the cost of
labor, the vehicle lease and its insurance, and any other overhead.64 In
2018, Amazon began requiring new intermediaries to lease vans from
Amazon, and to obtain insurance and manage payroll through select
providers.65 These changes allow Amazon to keep track of how its intermediary spends its contract fees to deliver packages and how much
profit remains.66 Amazon, then, has the knowledge necessary to maximize its profits by keeping its intermediaries’ profits low. When
61. Eugene Kim, Amazon Can Already Ship to 72% of US Population Within a Day, This Map
Shows, CNBC (May 5, 2019, 3:07 PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/05/amazon-can-alreadyship-to-72percent-of-us-population-in-a-day-map-shows.html.
62. See First Amended Complaint, supra note 1, at 2.
63. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, 3,200 Amazon Drivers Are Going to Lose Their
Jobs, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 27, 2020, 3:22 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/3200-amazon-drivers-are-going-to-lose-their-jobs [hereinafter 3,200 Amazon Drivers to Lose Jobs].
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Caroline O’Donovan & Ken Bensinger, The Cost of Next-Day Delivery: Amazon’s NextDay Delivery Has Brought Chaos and Carnage to America’s Streets—but the World’s Biggest Retailer Has a System to Escape the Blame, BUZZFEED NEWS (Sept. 6, 2019, 5:14 PM),
https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/carolineodonovan/amazon-next-day-delivery-deaths
[hereinafter The Cost of Next-Day Delivery].
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Amazon discovers an intermediary making a substantial profit, it can
change the terms of its contracts—in one case, by rescinding the monies needed to cover the cost of dispatchers, forcing intermediaries to
pay those costs out of their profit margins.67
Amazon can make use of this method for profit maximization because of its DSPs’ lack of bargaining power, which Amazon itself
fuels. Amazon initially began its delivery service in 2014 by enlisting
large delivery firms qualified to handle hundreds or thousands of delivery routes.68 In 2018, Amazon began to aggressively shift to small
intermediaries capable of managing only a few dozen routes, paying
them as much as 5 percent less per route than its traditional partners.69
These small companies lack the leverage to negotiate effectively with
a behemoth like Amazon.70 As in the garment industry, these intermediaries may rely exclusively on Amazon for contracts71 and are thus
forced to compete against each other for these contracts. Amazon
monitors and ranks the performance of its intermediaries, rewarding
good performance with more contracts and rescinding contracts from
intermediaries that fall behind or speak out against Amazon’s practices.72 An owner of Lasership, an Amazon DSP, stated that asking for
even a 5 percent raise in contract prices would lead a company like
Amazon to terminate all contracts with the intermediary.73 Amazon
further exacerbates this competition by ensuring that it has many intermediaries to choose from. Amazon recently claimed to have “enabled the creation” of at least two hundred new intermediaries74 by offering business training and special pricing on vans and insurance
programs.75 Amazon asserts that entrepreneurs may start a successful
67. Id.
68. 3,200 Amazon Drivers to Lose Jobs, supra note 63.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Callahan, supra note 7.
72. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66.
73. Farhang Aryan Deposition of Aug. 13, 2012 at 162, Sanchez v. Lasership, Inc., 937 F.
Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Va. 2013) (1:12-cv-00246-GBL-TRJ), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/lasership_aryan_deposition3.pdf; Dave Jamieson, Meet the Real Amazon Drones, HUFFPOST
(Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/amazon-delivery-lasership_n_5193956.
74. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66.
75. Getting Started, AMAZON LOGISTICS, https://logistics.amazon.com/marketing/gettingstarted (last visited Feb. 21, 2021); Hayley Peterson, Missing Wages, Grueling Shifts, and Bottles
of Urine: The Disturbing Accounts of Amazon Delivery Drivers May Reveal the True Human Cost of ‘Free’ Shipping, BUS. INSIDER (Sept. 11, 2018, 10:48 AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/amazon-delivery-drivers-reveal-claims-of-disturbing-work-conditions-2018-8.
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DSP business with as little as $10,000,76 and further provides $10,000
in rebates to select DSPs operated by U.S. veterans.77 The ease with
which Amazon allows the creation of new intermediaries ensures that
its DSPs will always have competitors, aggravating the need of DSPs
to meet Amazon’s goals and maintain their contracts.
As a result, Amazon’s intermediaries routinely resort to worker
abuses, creating the sweatshop “race to the bottom.” Though Amazon
does not directly engage in these abuses, it has established a business
model that indirectly promotes worker exploitation. Amazon requires
that 999 orders out of 1,000 be made on time.78 To ensure on time
deliveries, Amazon monitors drivers through handheld package scanners known as “rabbits.”79 A typical route may exceed 250 deliveries
in a single day, and it is well-reported that drivers routinely work long
hours, skip meals, and urinate in bottles to stay on track.80 Faced with
razor-thin profit margins, intermediaries have withheld pay from drivers to stay afloat.81 To cut costs and maintain contracts over competitors, intermediaries even engage in misclassification, labelling their
drivers as independent contractors and then forcing them to sign contracts lowering their own rate.82
This exploitation of workers is the direct consequence of the
choices made by leads like Amazon. The artificially low contract
prices that Amazon and others are able to extract from intermediaries
directly affect the way in which intermediaries treat their workers and
whether workers receive minimum wage and overtime.83 This sweating system is the result of a rational incentive structure; to put an end
to this worker exploitation, laws must be introduced to curtail these
incentives. As Shirley Lung states, “[t]he strong, direct, and foreseeable nexus between low contract prices and sweatshop conditions justifies the imposition of joint liability.”84 But does the use of
76. AMAZON LOGISTICS, https://logistics.amazon.com/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
77. After the Military, an Entrepreneur Is Born, AMAZON.COM: TRANSP. BLOG (Jan. 21,
2019), https://blog.aboutamazon.com/transportation/after-the-military-an-entrepreneur-is-born.
78. Callahan, supra note 7.
79. Peterson, supra note 75.
80. Id.
81. The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66.
82. Milton Sanchez Deposition of Aug. 21, 2012 at 42, 92, Sanchez v. Lasership, Inc., 937
F.Supp. 2d 730 (E.D. Va. 2013) (1:12-cv-00246-GBL-TRJ), http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/milton_sanchez_deposition2.pdf; Jamieson, supra note 73.
83. Lung, supra note 26, at 302.
84. Id. at 353.
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intermediaries inherently cause more harm than good? If not, what
makes it so deleterious when Amazon uses intermediaries?
III. THE BENEFITS OF INTERMEDIARIES AND THE FRANCHISE MODEL
Undeniably, the use of intermediaries can have strong, positive
effects on consumers. Amazon’s business strategy of amassing intermediaries and avoiding employment costs has allowed it to provide
one- or two-day shipping in the contiguous United States for a low
monthly payment. Since 2015, Amazon has nearly tripled its logistics
infrastructure, spurring its competitors to innovate their own systems.85 By tightening delivery times, e-commerce is increasingly becoming a viable alternative to brick-and-mortar shopping—and consumers have placed greater value in e-commerce during the COVID19 pandemic.86
Perhaps most importantly, the use of intermediaries fosters entrepreneurship. Each intermediary is its own business, buoyed by the labor needs of its lead, but free to grow and branch out in any way it
sees fit. The leaders who choose to run an intermediary do not just
make a living—they develop managerial experience and build credibility as business owners. This expertise is valuable and will translate
to new ventures should these entrepreneurs choose to move on to
greener pastures.
Small businesses can themselves benefit from the use of intermediaries. An entrepreneur who lacks the capital or know-how to manage
their own workers may nevertheless build a business by outsourcing
his labor needs to others. Over one million small- and medium-sized
businesses sell their products on Amazon, and many choose Amazon’s
delivery network for their shipping needs.87 By taking advantage of
Amazon, entrepreneurs outsource the costs of customer service, shipment of individual orders, and returns.88

85. Kim, supra note 61.
86. Sarah Perez, COVID-19 Pandemic Accelerated Shift to E-Commerce by 5 Years, New Report Says, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 24, 2020, 8:42 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2020/08/24/covid-19pandemic-accelerated-shift-to-e-commerce-by-5-years-new-report-says/.
87. Jeff Wilke, Small Businesses Reaching Customers Around the World, AMAZON.COM:
SMALL BUS. BLOG (May 3, 2018), https://www.aboutamazon.com/news/small-business/smallbusinesses-reaching-customers-around-the-world.
88. Seller Page, AMAZON.COM, https://sell.amazon.com/fulfill.html (last visited Feb. 21,
2021).
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A reasonable person could believe that the benefits of using intermediaries outweigh the risk of sweatshop conditions. In fact, the franchise model provides an example of intermediary use that does not
necessarily result in sweatshop conditions. 89 The differences between
the franchise model and Amazon’s use of intermediaries provide insight into the ways that established financial incentives can counteract
downward wage pressures.
Under a general franchise contract, the franchisor sells the franchisee a license to use the franchisor’s brand name at a particular location for a specified period of time; the franchisee pays this upfront
fee and agrees to give the franchisor a portion of its revenues.90 To
maintain the reputation of the brand, the franchise contract includes
precise provisions regarding operating policies.91 A franchise agreement presents a unique opportunity for entrepreneurs: it allows them
to gain experience as the owner of a business with an established reputation and a successful business strategy.92 The franchisor gains access to a new market, fostering inter-brand competition.93
Much like the lead-intermediary relationship, the franchise model
provides franchisors the means to retain indirect control of the venture
while avoiding the costs and liabilities of day-to-day operations.94 In
fact, prior to Proposition 22’s passage, Uber and Lyft considered the
franchise model as an alternative to classifying their drivers as employees under California’s AB 5.95 Though franchisee-owned businesses tend to engage in more hour and wage violations than their
franchisor-owned counterparts,96 the franchise model seems less susceptible to sweatshop conditions and the so-called race to the bottom.

89. This is not to say that the franchise model has no effect on downward wage pressures. See
generally Andrew Elmore, Franchise Regulation for the Fissured Economy, 86 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 907 (2018) (discussing the franchise model and its effects on employment law compliance).
90. MinWoong Ji & David Weil, Does Ownership Structure Influence Regulatory Behavior?
The Impact of Franchising on Labor Standards Compliance 5 (Bos. U. Sch. Mgmt., Working Paper
No. 2010-21, 2009), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1623387.
91. Id. at 6.
92. Id.
93. Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 195–96 (2010).
94. Elmore, supra note 89, at 915.
95. Kate Conger, Uber and Lyft Consider Franchise-Like Model in California, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/18/technology/uber-lyft-franchise-california.html.
96. Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 36–37. On average, a franchisee-owned business owes $4,265
more in back wages. Id. at 36.
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Why is this? For one, the franchisor does not benefit from direct
competition between its franchisees.97 The franchisor collects revenue
from each franchisee-owned business and thus has an incentive to ensure the success of each franchisee.98 Rather than pitting franchisees
against each other, as Amazon does with its intermediaries, franchisors seek to maximize their profit by boosting the royalties and fees
they receive from their franchisees across the board.99
Further, the franchise relationship itself incentivizes stronger cooperation between the franchisor and the franchisee. Unlike Amazon’s
contracts with its intermediaries, which it may terminate with ease,100
a franchise agreement often requires a long-term relationship.101 Most
franchises have relatively large upfront costs—they require a brickand-mortar storefront, industry-specific licensing, and extensive training from the franchisor.102 For these reasons, a franchise agreement
may last as long as twenty years.103 Because the relationship is longterm, the franchisor has an increased incentive to ensure franchiseeowned businesses are run successfully. A franchisor cannot escape an
unsuccessful franchise agreement without causing a breach of contract.104
Finally, the franchisor’s focus on its reputation incentivizes it to
ensure that franchisees comply with labor law. Empirical research suggests that franchisors consider labor compliance as a source of brand
reputation.105 This is likely because franchises often involve direct
contact with consumers in a way that Amazon’s delivery service does
not: labor compliance may correlate to better service quality, or consumers may be sensitive to publicly-visible labor violations.106 To this
end, franchisors typically require training on compensation and benefits107 and provide franchisees with payroll software to calculate gross

97. Id. at 2.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 6–7.
100. See The Cost of Next-Day Delivery, supra note 66.
101. See A Consumer’s Guide to Buying a Franchise, FED. TRADE COMM’N 2 (June 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/plain-language/591a_buying_a_franchise_sept_2020.pdf.
102. Id. at 1–2, 8.
103. Id. at 2.
104. Id.
105. Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 37–38.
106. Id. at 38.
107. Elmore, supra note 89, at 921.
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wages owed to employees. 108 These efforts are not always successful
in preventing labor violations,109 but they do represent a good faith
effort to ensure labor compliance. Though the franchise model is not
perfect, it provides a helpful example of intermediary use that does not
necessarily entail flagrant labor violations.
Unfortunately, neither the federal government nor California has
developed law that adequately balances the beneficial aspects of labor
outsourcing and the use of intermediaries while addressing the abuses
of the lead-intermediary relationship. Despite strong assurances of the
depth and breadth of employment law, both jurisdictions have developed lenient standards that allow nefarious leads, like Amazon, to
avoid responsibility for their role in incentivizing labor violations.
Nevertheless, the history of these standards provides a useful backdrop
for a more robust joint employment doctrine.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL LAW UNDER THE FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT OF 1938
In 1938, Congress passed the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA),
which greatly expanded the rights of workers and paved the way for
joint employment analysis by providing an expansive definition of
employment for the purpose of wage and hour actions.110 However,
federal courts have failed to develop a common and effective framework by which plaintiff workers can enforce their rights against leads
such as Amazon.
A. History of the Fair Labor Standards Act
The FLSA was born out of early twentieth-century shifts in the
labor market that had led to extremely weak employee bargaining
power regarding hours and wages.111 In the 1920s, as a result of collapsed agricultural prices, nearly twenty million Americans moved
from rural to urban areas.112 This emigration created an expansive pool
108. Id. at 928–29.
109. See, e.g., Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1028 (9th Cir. 2019). McDonald’s
supplied a franchisee-owned business with timekeeping software that did not correctly measure
overtime. Id.; see discussion infra Part VIII.
110. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.); see infra Section IV.B.
111. See Carl H. Petkoff, Note, Joint Employment Under the FLSA: The Fourth Circuit’s Decision to Be Different, 70 S.C. L. REV. 1125, 1127–28 (2019).
112. Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 97–98 (2000).
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of labor in cities.113 At the same time, advances in technology led to
greater industrial production efficiency, meaning more work could be
performed with fewer workers.114 Competition for limited industrial
positions put the average worker in a weak position for negotiating
hours and wages.115 This lack of bargaining power was particularly
pronounced among members of the new workforce, such as women,
who were shunted into sweatshop conditions.116 At the time, there existed no federal wage or hour protections.117
In the 1930s, in the midst of the Great Depression, President
Franklin Roosevelt led efforts to create federal law addressing this discrepancy in bargaining power and the resulting exploitation of
sweated workers.118 His early efforts, such as the National Industrial
Recovery Act, did not survive scrutiny by the Lochner Court, but in a
joint effort with Secretary of Labor Frances Perkins, Congress passed
the FLSA in 1938.119 The Act established a national minimum wage,
set a maximum weekly workload without overtime of forty-four hours
(to decrease to forty hours within three years), and eliminated child
labor.120
The consequences of the Act were immense. Congress described
its intent in passing the Act as to eliminate “labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers.”121 The
Supreme Court later maintained that the FLSA was meant “to eliminate, as rapidly as practicable, substandard labor conditions throughout the nation.”122 At the time the Act passed, eleven million workers
benefited from these new regulations.123

113. Id. at 98.
114. See Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1127.
115. Harris, supra note 112, at 98.
116. Id. at 50–51, 98.
117. Id. at 20.
118. Id. at 103; Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1128.
119. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1128–30.
120. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, §§ 6, 7, 12, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 212).
121. Id. § 2.
122. Powell v. U.S. Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497, 510 (1950).
123. Harris, supra note 112, at 140.
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B. Ensuring Compliance with the FLSA
In passing such an expansive act, the proponents of the FLSA recognized the threat that businesses would avoid compliance.124 Congress feared that business formalities, such as contractual terms designating workers as independent contractors rather than employees,
would allow businesses to evade coverage.125 In an effort to curb such
practices, the FLSA defined employment in a manner intended to
reach a broader range of working relationships than just those covered
under the common law.126
Under the FLSA, the definition of “employ” includes “to suffer
or permit to work.”127 The Supreme Court has remarked that “[a]
broader or more comprehensive coverage of employees . . . would be
difficult to frame.”128 Given the importance of labor rights, the Court
has further stated that this definition “must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.”129
To further ensure compliance with the FLSA, the Department of
Labor introduced the concept of joint employment to its regulations in
1939.130 Though the FLSA does not itself use the words “joint employment,” the Supreme Court has recognized that its “suffer or permit” definition of employment applies in joint employment actions.131
Despite this, the Court has never determined the exact scope of this
definition of employment, leaving its interpretation to the circuit
courts.132
124. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1937: Joint Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Educ.
and Lab. and the H. Comm. on Lab. on S. 2475 and H.R. 7200, 75th Cong. 181 (1937) (statement
of Hon. Frances Perkins, Sec. of Lab.) (“One of the greatest difficulties to overcome, if legislation
of this character is to be successful is that of enforcement.”).
125. Kati L. Griffith, The Fair Labor Standards Act at 80: Everything Old Is New Again, 104
CORNELL L. REV. 557, 594 (2019).
126. James Reif, ‘To Suffer or Permit to Work’: Did Congress and State Legislatures Say What
They Meant and Mean What They Said?, 6 NE. U. L.J. 347, 351 (2013).
127. 29 U.S.C. § 203(g) (2018).
128. United States v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362 (1945) (holding that the FLSA definition
of employment applies to piece-rate workers, i.e., workers paid per unit of creation).
129. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Muscoda Local No. 123, 321 U.S. 590, 597 (1944), superseded by statute in part, The Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 49, 61 Stat. 84 (codified as
amended at 27 U.S.C. §§ 251–262), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 574 U.S.
27 (2014). The Court specifies it is referring to 29 U.S.C. § 203(g). Id. at 597–98.
130. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1130.
131. See Rutherford Food Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 728, 730 (1947) (holding that,
under the FLSA, plaintiff meat boners could be employed by both a middleman who hired, paid,
and supervised them and the business that engaged the middleman); Reif, supra note 126, at 352.
132. Reif, supra note 126, at 352–53.
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C. The Current Circuit Split
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, the circuit courts are
currently split in determining how the “suffer or permit” standard applies to leads in joint employment actions.133 Though the courts tend
to cite to the “suffer or permit” language and the Supreme Court’s determination of its broad coverage, they vary broadly in their application, relying on verbiage and terms of art that appear nowhere in the
statutory text.134
The circuit split first became pronounced with Bonnette v. California Health and Welfare Agency135 in 1983. In Bonnette, the Ninth
Circuit elucidated four nonexclusive factors that “provide a useful
framework” for determining joint employment: “whether the alleged
employer (1) had the power to hire and fire the employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4)
maintained employment records.”136 This framework became known
as the “economic realities” test and focuses on whether a worker is
economically dependent upon the lead.137
By contrast, the Second Circuit applies a six-factor test to determine whether the lead exercises “functional control” over a worker,
developed in the 2003 case Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co.138 Most circuit courts apply some combination of factors from the economic realities and functional control tests, often considering additional factors
they feel are pertinent to the analysis.139 In 2017, the Fourth Circuit
expressly rejected these two tests, instead developing its own six-factor test in Salinas v. Commercial Interiors, Inc.,140 focusing on the
133. See Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1011; Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1134–39 (providing a
brief description of each circuit court’s test for joint employment).
134. Reif, supra note 126, at 353–54. Reif notes concepts such as “economic reality,” “dependence,” and “functional control.” Id. at 354.
135. 704 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1983).
136. Id. at 1470.
137. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1132.
138. 355 F.3d 61, 71–72 (2d Cir. 2003). The factors are (1) whether the worker used the putative
employer’s premises and equipment; (2) whether the worker could easily shift work from one putative employer to the other; (3) the extent to which the work performed was integral to the putative
employer’s business; (4) whether work responsibilities could be passed from subcontractor to another without material changes; (5) the degree to which the putative employer supervised the
worker; and (6) whether the worker worked exclusively or predominately for the putative employer.
Id. at 72. District courts are also permitted to consider economic reality factors. See id. at 71.
139. Petkoff, supra note 111, at 1134–39. Of note, the modern Ninth Circuit test applies thirteen
separate factors. Id. at 1137.
140. 848 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 2017).
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relationship between the putative joint employers, rather than on a
lead’s relationship with the worker.141 Given the lack of clear statutory
language and the absence of Supreme Court guidance, the federal
framework for joint employment actions is varied and complex. Rather than a single and simple standard, the circuit courts have developed multiple tests, each relying upon a set of similar yet distinct factors. Consequently, legal scholars have criticized these tests as
unpredictable and susceptible to manipulation by employers and
judges.142 At the federal level, joint employment remains an unsettled
area of law.
V. CALIFORNIA LAW UNDER MARTINEZ V. COMBS
In 2010, by contrast, the California Supreme Court created a relatively straightforward test for joint employment in the case of Martinez v. Combs.143 The court, for the first time in its history, interpreted
the definitions of employment under the California Industrial Welfare
Commission (IWC) wage orders, rejecting the FLSA’s definition.144
In doing so, the court propounded upon the meaning of “suffering or
permitting” work when determining whether a business is a joint employer for the purpose of state wage and hour actions.145 Ultimately,
the court determined that a lead is liable where it (1) has knowledge

141. Id. at 139. The six factors are:
(1) [w]hether, formally or as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly
determine, share, or allocate the power to direct, control, or supervise the worker,
whether by direct or indirect means; (2) [w]hether, formally or as a matter of practice,
the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate the power to—directly
or indirectly—hire or fire the worker or modify the terms or conditions of the worker’s
employment; (3) [t]he degree of permanency and duration of the relationship between
the putative joint employers; (4) [w]hether, through shared management or a direct or
indirect ownership interest, one putative joint employer controls, is controlled by, or is
under common control with the other putative joint employer; (5) [w]hether the work is
performed on a premises owned or controlled by one or more of the putative joint employers, independently or in connection with one another; and (6) [w]hether, formally or
as a matter of practice, the putative joint employers jointly determine, share, or allocate
responsibility over functions ordinarily carried out by an employer, such as handling
payroll; providing workers’ compensation insurance; paying payroll taxes; or providing
the facilities, equipment, tools, or materials necessary to complete the work.
Id. at 141–42.
142. Lung, supra note 26, at 325–26.
143. See Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259 (Cal. 2010).
144. See id. at 267–68.
145. See id. at 279.
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that work is occurring, (2) has the ability to prevent the work, and (3)
fails to prevent the work.146
In applying this definition of employment to the facts of the case,
the court focused on the lead’s ability to prevent the work by hiring,
firing, or supervising the worker,147 much like the Ninth Circuit’s economic realities test. Where a lead possesses such control over a
worker, liability for unpaid wages will attach.148
A. The Facts of Martinez
In Martinez, a strawberry farmer, Munoz, was unable to pay
wages to his seasonal agricultural workers.149 These workers brought
action for unpaid wages under California Labor Code section 1194
against both Munoz and two of the four produce merchants to whom
he sold strawberries.150 Munoz declared bankruptcy and was discharged from the case, leaving the plaintiff-workers’ only hope for
recompense with a finding of liability on behalf of Munoz’s produce
merchants.151 To establish such liability, the plaintiff-workers claimed
that, along with Munoz, the produce merchants were their joint employers.152
The problem for these plaintiff-workers, though, was that Munoz
alone engaged in the common tasks of an employer, such as hiring,
firing, and the setting of hours and wages.153 The produce merchants,
for their part, had very limited interactions with the plaintiff-workers:
all business was conducted through Munoz.154 Aside from minor supervisory functions, such as training workers how to pack the strawberries, the merchants were not involved in the workers’ day-to-day
operations.155

146. Id. at 281.
147. Id. at 282.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 265.
150. Id. at 266. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1194 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.)
states in part, “any employee receiving less than the legal minimum wage or the legal overtime
compensation applicable to the employee is entitled to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance
of the full amount of this minimum wage or overtime compensation, including interest thereon,
reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.”
151. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 263.
152. Id. at 266–67.
153. Id. at 264.
154. See id. at 284.
155. Id. at 286.
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To maximize the chances of a finding of liability against the produce merchants, the plaintiff-workers contended that the California
IWC definitions of “employ” and “employer” applied to the action.156
Under these definitions, an employer “directly or indirectly, or
through an agent or any other person, employs or exercises control
over the wages, hours, or working conditions” of a worker.157 To “employ” itself means “to engage, suffer, or permit to work.”158
The superior court granted summary judgment for the merchants.159 The court of appeal, finding no case law interpreting the
IWC’s definitions, applied the Ninth Circuit’s economic realities test
for use under the FLSA and found that the merchants did not exercise
adequate control over the plaintiffs to be deemed joint employers.160
The California Supreme Court granted review to determine how the
IWC definitions should be interpreted and applied in joint employment actions.161
B. Defining Employment Under the Industrial Welfare Commission
Wage Orders
The court reviewed the IWC wage orders to expound on its definitions of employment.162 In 1916, the IWC adopted its first wage order, establishing a minimum wage for women and children in the vegetable canning industry.163 Though it did not contain a definition of
employment, the order held businesses liable for unpaid wages where
they “employ[ed] or suffer[ed] or permit[ted]” any woman or child to
work.164 In 1947, the IWC added a separate definition of “employer”
as one who “employs or exercises control over the wages, hours, or
working conditions of any person.”165 Further, the court held that the
IWC did not intend these definitions to supersede the common law
employment relationship, as doing so would have withheld wage and
156. Id. at 266–67.
157. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11010(2)(F) (2001). The IWC provided industry-specific wage
orders, but its definitions of employment remain the same across industries. See, e.g., id.; id. §
11020(2)(F) (applying the same definitions of employment to the manufacturing and personal services industries, respectively).
158. Id. § 11010(2)(D).
159. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 267.
160. Id. The Ninth Circuit’s economic realities test is discussed supra Section IV.C.
161. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 268.
162. Id. at 273–74.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 273 (quoting Cal. Indus. Welfare Comm’n, Order No. 1 (1916)).
165. Id. at 274 (quoting CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 8, § 11140(2)(F) (2002)).
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hour protections from regularly employed workers, who comprised
the bulk of California’s workforce.166
The court thus determined that “employ,” for the purposes of California wage and hour actions, has three definitions: “(a) to exercise
control over the wages, hours or working conditions, or (b) to suffer
or permit to work, or (c) to engage, thereby creating a common law
employment relationship.”167 A business is liable for unpaid wages
where any one definition is met.168
Returning to the facts of the case, the Martinez court was quickly
able to eliminate two of these definitions from application. The produce merchants neither engaged the plaintiff-workers by creating a
common law master-servant relationship nor exercised control over
their wages, hours, or working conditions.169 At all times, Munoz
maintained control over his business operations.170 Wages were paid
from his account, stemming from revenue from a variety of merchants.171 The court conceded that supervision is a “working condition” under the IWC’s definitions,172 but found that the merchants’
ability to advise the plaintiffs about the manner by which strawberries
were to be packed did not rise to the requisite level of supervision or
control.173 Given this finding, the ultimate issue of the case was
whether the produce merchants had “suffered or permitted” the work
of the plaintiffs and could thus be held liable as employers.174
In beginning its analysis of the “suffer or permit” standard, the
court noted that the IWC was created in 1913, twenty-five years before
the FLSA.175 The court thus held that IWC’s use of the “suffer or permit” language, first promulgated in 1916, is not based upon federal
law.176 The definition of “suffer or permit” in California is not constrained by the language of the FLSA or the economic realities test,
which was first implied into the language of the FLSA by the United

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.

Id. at 278.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
See id.
Id. at 284–285, 287.
Id. at 284.
Id.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 286–87.
Id.
Id. at 270.
Id. at 279.
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States Supreme Court in 1961177 and later developed by the Ninth Circuit in Bonnette.178 In separating the IWC’s language from that of the
FLSA, the court recognized that enforcement of state wage laws allows for greater worker protections than the federal law affords.179
To determine whether the produce merchants “suffered or permitted” the work performed by the worker-plaintiffs, the court was thus
required to develop its own interpretation of the words. The court explained that the language first appeared in model child labor laws in
the early 1900s.180 The court then purported to base its interpretation
of the language on case law resulting from the application of these
child labor laws.181 The court found that the IWC did not intend “suffer or permit” to mean anything other than its meaning in these early
cases and decided that “suffer or permit” would be given its historical
meaning.182
In reviewing several child labor cases, the Martinez court determined that the “suffer or permit” language was used to create liability
even where no common law employment relationship existed between
the child and the purported employer.183 A business proprietor “suffered or permitted” the work of a child “working in his or her business”
by acquiescing to the work or failing to hinder it.184 This definition
thus reached irregular working arrangements otherwise not covered by
the common law.185 Instead, “the basis of liability [was] the owner’s
failure to perform the duty of seeing to it that the prohibited condition
does not exist.”186 Utilizing these cases, the Martinez court concluded
that a business “suffers or permits” work, and is thus liable under wage
and hour actions, when the business (1) has knowledge that work is
occurring, (2) has the ability to prevent the work, and (3) fails to prevent the work.187
177. Id. (citing Goldberg v. Whitaker House Coop., 366 U.S. 28, 33 (1961)).
178. See discussion supra Section IV.C.
179. Martinez, 231 P.3d at 280–81.
180. Id. at 273.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 281.
183. Id.
184. Id. (a businessowner “shall not employ by contract, nor shall he permit by acquiescence,
nor suffer by a failure to hinder” the work (quoting Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 134 P. 1125,
1129 (Okla. 1913))).
185. Id. at 273.
186. Id. at 281 (emphasis omitted) (quoting People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-SlawsonDecker Co., 167 N.Y.S. 958, 961 (App. Div. 1917)).
187. Id.
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C. Martinez’s Narrowing of the “Suffer or Permit” Standard
Applying this definition to the facts of the case, the Martinez
court noted the potential power of such a broad definition of employment. Finding that the produce merchants lacked direct power to prevent the plaintiffs from working, the court nonetheless mused that the
merchants may have prevented the plaintiffs’ work by ceasing to buy
strawberries from Munoz.188 Without a purchaser, there would be no
reason to produce strawberries, and thus no reason to hire laborers to
work.189 The court decided that such indirect forms of preventing work
should not be considered when assessing employment under the “suffer or permit” standard.190 If a merchant could be found to be an employer simply because they purchased produce, would an individual
consumer of strawberries also employ the workers who harvested
them?191
Instead, the court focused on direct means by which a business
may prevent work, finding that Munoz alone had the power to “hire
and fire [the plaintiff-workers] . . . and to tell them when and where to
report to work.”192 According to the Martinez court, a purported employer has the ability to prevent work, and thus suffers or permits
work, only if it has control over the hiring, firing, or supervision of a
worker.193 As will be shown, this is a substantial narrowing of the definition from the understanding of the child labor cases where the “suffer or permit” language first appeared.
The Martinez court ultimately affirmed the merchants’ motion for
summary judgment, holding that the merchants did not (1) control the
plaintiffs’ hours, wages, or working conditions, (2) establish a common law employment relationship with the plaintiffs, or (3) suffer or
permit the plaintiffs’ work.194
D. The Aftermath of Martinez
Following Martinez, courts have continued to focus their review
of the “suffer or permit” standard of employment on the lead’s ability
to hire, fire, or supervise a worker. In two recent cases, the California
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

Id. at 282.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 287.
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Courts of Appeal were asked to determine whether the franchisor Shell
was a joint employer of workers employed by its franchisees for the
purpose of wage and hour actions. In Henderson v. Equilon Enterprises,195 the court found that Shell “had no power to fire plaintiff, hire
his replacement, or prevent him from working” despite the ability of
Shell to ask the franchisee to “remove” employees with good cause.196
In Curry v. Equilon Enterprises,197 the court concluded that Shell
“could not acquiesce” to the worker’s employment because the franchisee was in control of its workers’ hiring, firing, and daily tasks.198
Finally, in Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp.,199 the Ninth Circuit, focusing on Curry’s analysis, applied California law to find that McDonald’s did not suffer or permit the work of its franchisee’s workers because it held no power over hiring or firing.200
Under Martinez, the “suffer or permit” standard of employment
hardly extends beyond the common law definition. By focusing on a
lead’s direct control over a worker through hiring, firing, and supervision, the court’s holding is evocative of the master-servant relationship. Despite noting that the IWC issued the standard to reach irregular
working arrangements not covered by the common law,201 the Martinez court nevertheless greatly limited its application. The Curry court
went further, insinuating that the ability to prevent work never concerns the lead’s ability to hinder the intermediary from engaging the
plaintiff in work.202 This interpretation of “suffer or permit” does not
match what the California Supreme Court would later call the IWC’s
“exceptionally broad” standard.203
VI. DYNAMEX: RETURNING TO A BROAD UNDERSTANDING OF “SUFFER
OR PERMIT”
In 2018, the California Supreme Court reexamined the “suffer or
permit” standard in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior

195. 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738 (Ct. App. 2019).
196. Id. at 747.
197. 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295 (Ct. App. 2018).
198. Id. at 311.
199. 944 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2019).
200. Id. at 1031.
201. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 273 (Cal. 2010).
202. Curry, 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 311–12 (“[The failure to prevent work from occurring] does
not concern failing to hinder a third party . . . . ”).
203. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 31 (Cal. 2018).
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Court.204 Unlike Martinez, Dynamex was not a joint employment case,
but rather focused on the misclassification of workers as independent
contractors.205 The court introduced the ABC test to determine
whether the hiring business misclassified workers as independent contractors, allowing the business to avoid providing employment
rights.206 The ABC test created a rebuttable assumption of employment for plaintiff-workers and established three prongs an employer
must meet to avoid an action under the IWC wage orders.207
Of great importance, the court implemented the ABC test as part
of the “suffer or permit” standard.208 In establishing the ABC test, the
court relied heavily upon Martinez and its underlying child labor
cases. 209 However, the ABC test’s application of the “suffer or permit”
standard only begins with Martinez’s interpretation of the ability to
hire, fire, or supervise a worker. The Dynamex court found that, in
addition to this control analysis, a business may also be found to be an
employer wherever a worker has performed work in the usual course
of the alleged employer’s business.210
A. The Facts of Dynamex
In 2004, Dynamex, a nationwide same-day delivery service much
like Amazon, reclassified its delivery drivers as independent contractors to avoid the costs of employment.211 The drivers were required to
provide their own vehicles and pay all transportation costs.212 They
were required to pay for Dynamex uniforms, which they were expected to wear.213 In some cases, drivers were further required to purchase and display Dynamex decals on their vehicles.214 Dynamex set
the rates to be charged for delivery and controlled the number and nature of deliveries its drivers obtained.215

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id. at 1.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 36–40.
Id. at 26, 37.
See id. at 37.
Id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Charles Lee, one such driver, led a class action against Dynamex
alleging labor violations, including a failure to pay overtime, based on
the premise that Dynamex misclassified its drivers as independent
contractors when they should have been classified as employees.216
Lee and the other plaintiffs argued that the three standards of employment elucidated in Martinez were applicable to the question of worker
misclassification.217 Dynamex, by contrast, argued that Martinez applied only to joint employment cases, and that the common law test
for employment laid out in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Department of
Industrial Relations218 was controlling.219 The California Supreme
Court granted the petition for review to consider whether the definitions of employment under the IWC’s wage orders, standardized under
Martinez, applied to misclassification claims.220
B. Dynamex’s Holding
The Dynamex court ultimately found that the “suffer or permit”
standard of employment applies to the question of misclassification.221
Following Martinez, the Dynamex court reemphasized the authority of
the IWC to promulgate the definition of “employ” that governs the
application of California’s wage orders.222 It again examined the child
labor cases from which the “suffer or permit” language was borrowed.223 It recognized the “exceptionally broad” scope of the standard.224
Most importantly, the Dynamex court justified its decision by expounding upon one of the findings of Martinez. Quoting Martinez, the
Dynamex court held that the “suffer or permit” standard “must be interpreted and applied broadly to include within the covered ‘employee’ category all individual workers who can reasonably be viewed
as ‘working in [the hiring entity’s] business,’” including those misclassified as independent contractors.225 Thus, a hiring entity would
216. Id. at 9–10.
217. Id. at 10.
218. 769 P.2d 399 (Cal. 1989).
219. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 10.
220. Id. at 7.
221. Id. at 26.
222. Id. at 29.
223. Id. at 26–27.
224. Id. at 31–32.
225. Id. at 32 (quoting Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010)) (“A proprietor who
knows that persons are working in his or her business without having been formally hired, or while
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not be liable under the “suffer or permit” standard for a traditional independent contractor operating their own independent business, 226 but
would be liable for all workers, regardless of classification, who could
reasonably be viewed as working in the hiring entity’s business.227
Using the framework of the “suffer or permit” standard, the Dynamex court then introduced the ABC test for determining whether a
worker has been misclassified as an independent contractor.228 Under
the ABC test, a worker is presumed to be an employee of the hiring
entity unless the hiring entity proves
(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of
the hiring entity in connection with the performance of the
work, both under the contract for the performance of the
work and in fact; and
(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual
course of the hiring entity’s business; and
(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the
same nature as the work performed.229
The ABC test was codified in 2019 by California’s AB 5.230 The introduction of the ABC test represented a major expansion of employment rights for workers improperly classified as independent contractors.
C. The Usual Course of Business: Expanding the “Suffer or Permit”
Standard
Dynamex’s understanding of the “suffer or permit” standard of
employment begins with a reconsideration of the analysis of Martinez.
Under the Martinez joint employment analysis, the test of whether a
lead employed a worker is based on the lead’s ability to hire, fire, or
supervise the worker.231 Prong A of the ABC test closely mirrors this
analysis with its focus on the “control and direction” a hiring entity
has over performance of the work. The Dynamex court, however,
being paid less than the minimum wage, clearly suffers or permits that work by failing to prevent
it, while having the power to do so.” (emphasis added) (quoting Martinez, 231 P.3d at 281)).
226. Id. at 33.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 35–36.
229. Id. at 35.
230. Assemb. B. 5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
231. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 282 (Cal. 2010); see supra Section V.C.
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recognized Prong A as a form of the common law test for employment
and included it within the ABC test only because if the common law
test is met, the broader “suffer or permit” standard must also necessarily be met.232 The court drew a comparison between Prong A and
the common law Borello test, suggesting that Martinez’s focus on hiring, firing, and supervision—all forms of control—was merely a revision of common law principles of employment.233
In establishing Prong B, the Dynamex court recognized that the
“suffer or permit” standard operates “independent of the question of
control.”234 Calling upon Martinez and its child labor antecedents, the
court, for a second time, acknowledged that the “suffer or permit”
standard was intended to “bring within the ‘employee’ category all
individuals who can reasonably be viewed as working ‘in [the hiring
entity’s] business.’”235 This language, mentioned though overlooked
in Martinez, represents a major departure from Martinez’s joint employment analysis.
In addition to the Martinez control factors, the Dynamex court
found that a business also suffers or permits work, and thus employs
the worker, when that work is comparable to the work expected of an
employee of the business. 236 The court provided helpful examples. A
retail company that hires a plumber to fix its pipes does not suffer or
permit the work because the retail company is not in the business of
fixing pipes.237 The plumber is not employed—he is rather an independent contractor engaged in their own independent business.238
However, a garment manufacturer suffers or permits the work of laborers engaged in sewing garments regardless of business formalities
because the manufacturer is in the business of sewing garments.239
With this focus on the usual course of business, the Dynamex court
232. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 36 (“[B]ecause a worker who is subject, either as a matter of contractual right or in actual practice, to the type and degree of control a business typically exercises
over employees would be considered an employee under the common law test, such a worker
would, a fortiori, also properly be treated as an employee for purposes of the suffer or permit to
work standard.”).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 37.
235. Id. (citing Martinez, 231 P.3d at 282).
236. Id. Of note, the Dynamex court cites Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1159. In his article, Goldstein called for this analysis to apply to labor contracting schemes like the lead-intermediary relationship. Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1161–62.
237. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37.
238. Id.
239. Id.
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established that the “suffer or permit” standard has a separate analysis
distinct from the issue of control—and distinct from the ability of a
business to hire, fire, or supervise a worker.
Nevertheless, subsequent courts have not extended this broadening of the “suffer of permit” standard to the joint employment context.
The Curry court found that the ABC test was limited to misclassification claims,240 but did not consider how Dynamex’s new formulation
of the “suffer or permit” standard might affect joint employment analysis. The Ninth Circuit, in Salazar, summarily dismissed the idea that
Dynamex has application outside of misclassification claims.241 The
Henderson court considered the applicability of Prong B analysis in
the joint employment context, but found that because workers in such
cases are employees of the intermediary, and thus already entitled—at
least nominally—to employment protections, such analysis would
make “little sense.”242 However, as the Lines case showed, the existence of employment protections does not guarantee that a worker will
recover for wage and hour violations. Further, the history of the “suffer or permit” language, and the policy concerns surrounding its creation, strongly supports Prong B analysis in joint employment cases.
VII. REEXAMINING JOINT EMPLOYMENT IN THE WAKE OF DYNAMEX
Dynamex’s expanded understanding of the “suffer or permit”
standard falls much more closely in line with its historical application
in the child labor cases from which the IWC borrowed the language.
The policy concerns that Dynamex and the ABC test are meant to address are equally present in the joint employment context. Dynamex’s
“usual course of business” analysis should complement Martinez’s
control factors in the joint employment context. There is no reason to
have separate tests for the “suffer or permit” definition based on
whether a wage action is brought as a joint employment or worker
misclassification claim. By reconciling Martinez with Dynamex, California courts will bring clarity to the question of employment and better protect the rights of exploited workers.

240. Curry v. Equilon Enters., 233 Cal. Rptr. 3d 295, 314 (Ct. App. 2018).
241. Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th Cir. 2019).
242. Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d 738, 753 (Ct. App. 2019).
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A. Legislative and Judicial History Supports Dynamex’s
Interpretation
In both Martinez and Dynamex, the California Supreme Court relied on the holdings of early child labor cases, where the “suffer or
permit” standard was first used and developed, to determine the intent
of the IWC in promulgating the standard.243 Martinez directly cites
three such cases when developing its understanding of the standard:
Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg,244 Purtell v. Philadelphia & Reading
Coal & Iron Co.,245 and People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield FarmsSlawson-Decker Co.246 Though these cases do not involve direct joint
employment, they stand for the principle that suffering or permitting
work is not limited to a firm’s ability to exercise control over the
worker in question. Rather, early courts, and by extension the IWC,
believed that a firm suffers or permits work within the usual course of
its business by failing to prevent the work through any means available
to it.
In each of these cases, businesses passively accepted the benefits
of labor performed by children despite the presence of statutes prohibiting the suffering of child labor. Each business was held liable regardless of whether it possessed any direct control over the child laborer
in question. In Purtell, for example, employees of a coal yard hired an
eleven-year-old to serve as their water-boy.247 Though the coal yard
did not employ the boy, and thus could not directly control his actions,
the court nonetheless held the coal yard liable because it had
knowledge of the work being performed and had not attempted to prevent the work by reprimanding the employees who hired the boy.248
These courts accepted that a business has a “duty of using reasonable care” to ensure that child labor does not take place.249 In Sheffield,
employees of a milk distributor hired children to stand guard over their
wagons while they left to make individual milk deliveries.250 In holding that the distributor suffered the children’s work, the court noted
that the purpose of labor statutes is
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

See, e.g., Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 281 (Cal. 2010); Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37.
134 P. 1125 (Okla. 1913).
99 N.E. 899 (Ill. 1912).
167 N.Y.S. 958 (App. Div. 1917).
Purtell, 99 N.E. at 900.
Id. at 902.
Id.
Sheffield, 167 N.Y.S. at 959.
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to impose upon the owner or proprietor of a business the duty
of seeing to it that the condition prohibited by the statute does
not exist. . . . The duty is an absolute one, and it remains with
him whether he carries on the business himself or intrusts
[sic] the conduct of it to others.251
This is an important insight about the reach of the “suffer or permit” standard. In Curtis, a factory foreman permitted a child to engage
in dangerous tasks that he was statutorily barred from performing.252
Under agency law, the court found the manufacturer liable because it
had delegated its agent, the foreman, express authority to oversee its
operations.253 A lead that entrusts its usual course of business to an
intermediary is functionally undistinguishable from a company that
delegates authority to supervisors to carry out its work. It follows that,
in both cases, a business has a duty to ensure that prohibited conditions
do not exist.
The ABC test—and Prong B in particular—acknowledges a common thread among these child labor cases: the purpose of the “suffer
or permit” standard is to create an extensive net of liability for firms
that benefit from labor violations. Just as the child labor cases did not
center on joint employment, neither did they deal directly with the
misclassification of workers. Nevertheless, they form the basis for the
ABC test because the “suffer or permit” standard was meant to be applicable in all employment contexts. The Dynamex court recognized
that the standard extends employment status to workers regardless of
their employer’s ability to directly control their work—which forms
the heart of the Martinez analysis. Employment—and the resulting liability for wage and hour violations—exists not just where a business
can hire, fire, or supervise a worker; it exists wherever a firm knowingly benefits from work performed in the usual course of its business
and fails to prevent that work.254 In this way, Dynamex mirrors the
intent of the IWC and early courts in utilizing the “suffer or permit”
language.
Though the ABC test is designed for misclassification claims,255
there is no reason its inclusion of the “usual course of business”
251. Id. at 960 (emphasis added).
252. Curtis & Gartside Co. v. Pigg, 134 P. 1125, 1127 (Okla. 1913).
253. Id. at 1129.
254. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35 (Cal. 2018).
255. Prong C, in particular, asks whether the worker is engaged in their own business, an issue
not present in joint employment cases. “Trying to apply Part C of the ABC test to joint employer
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analysis under the “suffer or permit” standard should be limited to
such claims. The “suffer or permit” standard has always relied upon
the common definitions of the two words.256 It makes little sense for
the standard to refer only to the Martinez control factors in joint employment claims but to further encapsulate the “usual course of business” analysis in worker misclassification claims. Rather, courts
should apply the standard uniformly to both types of claims. Such a
standardization would simplify the law and provide recognition that
the policy concerns of Dynamex are present in all wage and hour
claims regardless of their form.
B. Policy Considerations Favor Dynamex’s Interpretation
In Dynamex, the court acknowledged two broad policy concerns
in favor of establishing the ABC test and its “usual course of business”
analysis. The first is largely unique to misclassification claims—classifying employees as independent contractors causes the federal and
state governments to lose billions in tax revenue.257 Because intermediaries in the lead relationship employ their workers, courts like Henderson have found lost tax revenue an inapplicable concern.258
But more importantly, Dynamex recognized that the broad “usual
course of business” analysis is necessary to prevent the so-called “race
to the bottom” where workers are stripped of the protections inherent
in their employment.259 The court identified that such a race occurs at
both individual and business-to-business levels. First, workers that desire employment protections are in competition with—and will ultimately be harmed by—those who are willing to forgo such protections
for a paycheck.260 Secondly, and as discussed above, law-abiding businesses are in competition with those willing to skirt employment
laws.261 Thus, the enforcement of employment laws must be broad and
robust to “create a level playing field” at both levels and to prevent the

claims recalls the proverbial square peg in a round hole.” Henderson v. Equilon Enters., 253 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 738, 754 (Ct. App. 2019).
256. See Curtis, 134 P. at 1129 (defining “suffer” to mean “not to forbid or hinder; to tolerate”);
Reif, supra note 126, at 380.
257. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 5.
258. Henderson, 253 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 752–53.
259. Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37–38.
260. Id. at 37.
261. Id. at 38; see discussion supra Section II.A.
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downward pressure on wages and conditions inherent in such economic competition.262
This justification is just as applicable to the lead-intermediary relationship as it is to worker misclassification. A lead outsourcing its
labor needs to smaller, competing intermediaries creates the same
downward pressure on wages and conditions as a business that gains
an unfair competitive edge by misclassifying its workers. Courts cannot simply focus on the role the intermediary plays in exploiting workers. The problem stems from the lead—so long as intermediaries protect the lead from liability, worker exploitation will occur. For every
intermediary that a court targets, a new one will pop up in its place to
support the lead. Thus, courts should rather focus on the role of the
lead in perpetuating worker exploitation.
Holding the lead liable for the abuses of its intermediaries makes
economic sense. First, the lead is in the best position to ensure compliance with labor law:
The purpose of the broad imposition of liability on business
owners with the power to prevent the work is to provide incentives for them to assert their power to prevent the violations. It is presumed that the power to prevent the performance of the work carries with it the power to allow the
work, conditioned on compliance with minimum labor standards contained in these laws.263
Secondly, the lead is in the best position to distribute the costs of labor
compliance.264 Any efforts by a lead to prevent worker abuses, either
by employing its own workers to perform the labor or by policing its
intermediaries, will have economic costs compared to the status quo.
Though these increased operational costs might be passed onto consumers, it is undoubtedly preferable to allowing the costs of labor violations to fall arbitrarily upon workers attempting to support themselves and their families.265
Finally, the lead is the party most susceptible to the deterrent effect of robust labor laws. Leads are fewer in number, have substantial
assets, live long corporate lives266 and would be exposed to exorbitant
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 37–38.
Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1137.
See Aditi Bagchi, Production Liability, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501, 2529–30 (2019).
See id. at 2530.
Id.
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costs if found liable for labor violations. Further, they have reputational interests to consider.267 Here, Amazon provides an example.
Following an exposé by Buzzfeed News and ProPublica, Senators
Richard Blumenthal, Elizabeth Warren, and Sherrod Brown sent a letter to Jeff Bezos questioning Amazon’s role in the abuse of its drivers.268 The publicity Amazon received led it to cancel contracts with a
number of intermediaries accused of labor violations and tort
claims.269 If leads are held accountable for labor violations, they will
be less likely to condone them.
Ultimately, the primary concern of courts should be to ensure
workers are protected by labor law. By focusing on the lead, rather
than its intermediaries, the legal system will be better able to curb the
“race to the bottom” and protect employment rights. By establishing a
more robust joint employment regime, courts can create a broad incentive structure encouraging leads to avoid labor violations and better
police their intermediaries. As shown by the franchise model, leads
are less likely to allow labor violations by their intermediaries where
incentives, legal or non-legal, exist to comply with labor laws.
Ensuring labor compliance will result in increased costs for the
lead, which will almost certainly pass these costs onto consumers. If
leads choose to employ their own workers rather than rely on intermediaries, the entrepreneurial efforts of small business owners will be
stifled. But Dynamex’s interpretation of the “suffer or permit” standard is not an extreme solution. With proper safeguards, a broad joint
employment doctrine can target the nefarious aspects of the lead-intermediary relationship without eliminating the benefits that intermediary use provides to small businesses and entrepreneurs.
VIII. SAFEGUARDS PROVIDING FOR THE BENEFICIAL USE OF
INTERMEDIARIES
Undoubtedly, a joint employment doctrine that utilizes both the
Martinez control factors and Dynamex’s usual course of business analysis will cast a broad net that captures bad actors like Amazon, as well
267. Id.
268. Letter from Sens. Richard Blumenthal, Elizabeth Warren and Sherrod Brown to Jeffrey
Bezos, Chairman, President & CEO, Amazon.com Inc. (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/blumenthal-elizabeth-warren-amazon-delivery.
269. Ken Bensinger et al., Amazon Is Firing Its Delivery Firms Following People’s Deaths,
BUZZFEED NEWS (Oct. 12, 2019, 8:02 PM), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/kenbensinger/amazon-is-severing-contracts-with-delivery-firms-linked-to.
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as innocuous—and even beneficial—uses of intermediaries, such as
the franchise model. Because labor outsourcing can provide support
for small businesses, and because the use of intermediaries fosters entrepreneurship, it is important that any joint employment doctrine does
not fully eliminate intermediary relationships. Luckily, the usual
course of business analysis is not all-encompassing, and the use of indemnification clauses can provide protection for businesses seeking to
utilize intermediaries. Finally, the state legislature may choose to recognize a defense for leads accused of labor violations: a lead may be
protected where it has made a good faith effort to ensure its intermediaries comply with labor laws.
A. The Limitations of the “Usual Course of Business” Analysis
In its analysis of the “suffer or permit” standard, the Martinez
court feared a joint employment doctrine that would ensnare every
party involved in the work performed: from the farmer who hired laborers to pick his fruit to the consumer who ultimately bought the fruit
at the grocery.270 But the Dynamex analysis has a limit: an alleged employer must be in the business of the work being performed. The Dynamex court explained this in simplistic terms: a retail store does not
employ a plumber it hires to fixes its pipes because the store is not in
the business of plumbing.271 Just so, neither does a fruit vendor or a
consumer employ a farm laborer because these actors are not in the
business of farming. But it is not always so clear where the line should
be drawn. Is Uber a taxi service or a software developer? Is McDonald’s in the business of flipping burgers or selling trademark licenses?
E-commerce and the delivery industry provide an example of the limits of the ABC test and of how small businesses may be sparred liability under a robust joint employment regime.
As mentioned previously, over one million small- and mediumsized businesses choose Amazon’s delivery network over traditional
carriers for their shipping needs.272 One could view these small Amazon sellers as leads, with Amazon and its DSPs acting as intermediaries. But one would be loath to find these sellers liable under joint employment theory for the workplace abuses of the delivery companies
involved. Why?
270. Martinez v. Combs, 231 P.3d 259, 282 (Cal. 2010).
271. Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 37 (Cal. 2018).
272. Wilke, supra note 87.
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The answer: effective and profitable e-commerce requires the
ability to efficiently deliver goods across the nation. Small entrepreneurial sellers lack the resources, infrastructure, and expertise to develop such a network. Thus, they must rely upon separate entities, such
as Amazon or FedEx, to effectuate delivery. The seller agrees to the
listed shipping rates, and once the goods are in the hands of the carrier,
the seller lacks any oversight over the process of delivery. Though the
delivery is an intrinsic part of the seller’s business, the seller cannot
be said to be in the business of delivery.273 Because of this, small
sellers should not be responsible as joint employers for labor violations for which they lacked any power to prevent. The same can be
said of all small businesses that lack the capital and expertise to oversee their own labor needs. To provide clarity and consistency—and to
encourage business ownership—the legislature could consider providing blanket exemptions from this analysis to particularly small businesses.274
Amazon, though, is not a small business. Rather, it has a national
delivery network, and it maintains control and oversight over the delivery of its goods that traditional sellers do not maintain. Because of
this, delivery is within Amazon’s usual course of business.275 Amazon
has far greater power to control the work performed and thus has the
power to prevent labor violations from occurring. Unlike a traditional
seller, Amazon can employ its own delivery drivers rather than outsource to a third party, or it can exercise its influence over its intermediaries to ensure that labor violations do not occur. For Amazon, the
use of intermediaries is a choice, and it is a choice that allows Amazon

273. This may explain why CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 specifically precludes use of the usual
course of business analysis to businesses that outsource their shipping needs to others. Shipping is
a special industry that requires capital and know-how far beyond what could reasonably be expected
of a typical business.
274. For example, CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 exempts businesses “with a workforce of fewer
than 25 workers, including those hired directly by the client employer and those obtained from, or
provided by, any labor contractor” and businesses “with five or fewer workers supplied by a labor
contractor or labor contractors to the client employer at any given time.” CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 2810.3(a)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.).
275. Though Amazon may claim to be a market platform rather than a delivery company, it
seems pertinent to note that 112 million Amazon users pay monthly for two-day shipping (and,
admittedly, other benefits). Number of Amazon Prime Members in the United States as of December
2019, STATISTA, https://www.statista.com/statistics/546894/number-of-amazon-prime-payingmembers/#:~:text=Number%20of%20U.S.%20Amazon%20Prime%20subscribers
%202013%2D2019&text=Amazon%20Prime%20is%20constantly%20growing,95%20million%20in%20June%202018 (last visited Feb. 21, 2021).
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to avoid employment laws while causing widespread harm to workers
downstream. The imposition of joint employment is warranted where
a lead could have prevented the conditions leading to its intermediaries’ labor violations by exercising the other options available to it. This
is not to say that Amazon must be prohibited from using intermediaries, but if it seeks to avoid liability for wage and hour violations, it
must seek other avenues of recourse.
B. Indemnification Clauses
Though a robust joint employment doctrine will hold leads that
outsource their labor needs liable as employers, these leads need not
bear the full cost—or any of the cost—associated with legal claims
stemming from alleged labor violations. A lead can continue to insulate itself from financial liability by requiring its intermediary to sign
an indemnification clause under which it agrees to pay the damages,
plus costs and fees, resulting from legal action against the lead.276 Under such an arrangement, the lead would be liable for labor violations
but would only suffer financial loss where its intermediary is underfinanced or judgment-proof. Such a setup would be beneficial for
workers: plaintiffs like Jeffery Lines would no longer bear the burden
of seeking recompense from a cash-poor intermediary. For leads, the
potential for liability would create incentives to (1) seek out intermediaries with a track record of labor compliance,277 (2) promote labor
compliance among its intermediaries, and (3) ensure that its contract
prices account for the minimum wage. However, indemnification
clauses—and the reduced risk of financial loss for labor violations
they provide—would continue to make the use of intermediaries an
attractive option.
C. Good Faith Efforts to Ensure Labor Compliance
Finally, the state legislature may consider creating a new affirmative defense providing basic protections for leads that have made a
good faith effort to ensure their intermediaries comply with labor laws.
The franchise model, for one, may be a lead-intermediary relationship
worth protecting in such a manner, given its robust cultivation of entrepreneurism. Where a franchisor has sought to prevent labor

276. Goldstein, supra note 50, at 1145.
277. Id.
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violations by its franchisees, and a franchisee has nevertheless promulgated such violations, courts might rightly hesitate to penalize the
franchisor.
Salazar provides an example of what might not constitute a good
faith effort by a franchisor to prevent labor violations. In Salazar, the
franchisor, McDonald’s, provided its franchisee with software meant
to assist in scheduling, timekeeping, and determining overtime pay.278
Unfortunately, the software did not correctly measure overtime and
failed to schedule government-mandated rest breaks and second meal
periods, causing the franchisee’s employees to miss out on overtime
pay.279 Though the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the Martinez control factors, spared McDonald’s by finding that it was not a joint employer,280
McDonald’s failure to program basic labor laws into its software,
though, undoubtedly constitutes a lackluster attempt to ensure labor
compliance.
To protect itself from liability by taking advantage of a good faith
defense, a lead must, somewhat paradoxically, take more control over
its relationship with its intermediaries. But this is not a radical change.
In the franchise model, for instance, franchisors already exercise substantial control: franchise agreements include strict provisions regarding operating policies and quality assurance.281 Further, standard franchise agreements already contain general provisions requiring the
franchisee to operate in compliance with labor laws, including the
FLSA.282 In Salazar, McDonald’s did not require its franchisee to utilize its timekeeping software283 but had it made such a requirement—
and had the software been adequately programmed—the resulting labor violations would likely not have occurred. This may be all that is
required to establish a lead’s good faith effort to prevent labor violations, and such a relatively small change may truly protect workers
from wage theft.
Ultimately, a broad expansion of employment will provide incentives for leads to actively engage in the prevention of labor violations.
In some cases, this may lead to the termination of intermediary relationships: a lead may choose to exercise total control of an enterprise
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Salazar v. McDonald’s Corp., 944 F.3d 1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2019).
Id. at 1028.
Id. at 1032.
Ji & Weil, supra note 90, at 6.
Id.
Salazar, 944 F.3d at 1028.
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if it will undoubtedly be held liable for the costs of employment. Nevertheless, beneficial lead-intermediary relationships, and particularly
the entrepreneurism that they foster, can be protected. Courts may use
a well-rounded and fair usual course of business analysis to excuse
small businesses that engage in labor outsourcing. Leads can protect
themselves by including indemnification clauses in their contracts and
by choosing labor-compliant intermediaries. The legislature can consider new legal defenses for leads that adequately police their intermediaries.
IX. CONCLUSION
The California Supreme Court and state legislature—through Dynamex and AB 5, respectively—have signaled a strong intent to protect the employment rights of gig economy workers misclassified as
independent contractors. In expressing the need for the robust ABC
test, these bodies have pointed to the unfair advantage misclassifying
companies have over those that employ their workers and the rise of
income inequality created by eroding workplace protections.284 But
these concerns are not limited to misclassification schemes. Rather,
they exist wherever a business outsources its labor needs to avoid the
costs and liability associated with employment. The lead-intermediary
relationship, illustrated here by Amazon’s use of DSPs, creates conditions that perpetuate substandard wages and other labor abuses. Without intervention, the use of this business practice will continue to exasperate working conditions and place strain on fair market
competition.
To effectively respond to this problem, the court or legislature
must simply extend their decisions in Dynamex and AB 5 to joint employment claims. Prong B of the ABC test—the usual course of business analysis—will allow plaintiffs like Jeffery Lines to obtain recompense from a lead where their intermediary employer is chronically
undercapitalized due to the nature of the lead-intermediary relationship. The legislative and judicial history of the “suffer or permit” definition of employment—which governs both Dynamex’s ABC test and
California’s current joint employment doctrine under Martinez—supports a comprehensive and dynamic employment standard. It makes
284. See Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 38 (Cal. 2018); Assemb. B.
5, 2019–2020 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019).
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little sense for the “suffer or permit” definition to be expansive in the
context of misclassification claims but constricted to the ability to
“hire, fire, or supervise” in joint employment analysis. More importantly, the threat of litigation and liability for labor violations will
encourage leads to develop business practices that better protect workers’ rights.
This answer is not a radical solution. Given the precedent of Dynamex and AB 5, California is in a unique position to extend labor
protections without completely restructuring its governing law. In fact,
under California Labor Code section 2810.3, the usual course of business analysis is already an accepted standard in some cases of labor
outsourcing.285 Furthermore, a more robust joint employment doctrine
would not necessarily disrupt the benefits that labor outsourcing can
provide to both business owners and consumers. The legislature may
choose to provide additional protections to businesses, and the courts
will continue to have discretion in applying the standard to specific
factual circumstances.
In the absence of extensive labor laws, fair wages and working
conditions would not exist. For over 100 years, from the publishing of
the IWC’s wage orders to the passage of AB 5, California has remained at the forefront of providing labor protections to its citizens.
The expansion of the joint employment doctrine is merely another step
on that path.

285. CAL. LAB. CODE § 2810.3 (West, Westlaw through Ch. 372 of 2020 Reg. Sess.); see discussion supra Section II.A.

